A. C of S. G-2
GHQ

Date 20 October 1950

MEMORANDUM For:

C of S	G-1	ADC
SGS	G-3	D C/S SCAP
C of S ROK ~~xxxx~~	G-4	JSPOG

Information & your file
Note & Return to
Appropriate Circulation
Noted
Necessary Action
Suspend to
Process Action to G-2
By draft (letter) (radio) (plan) (order)
Return with reference paper
Comment to G-2
By memo Orally

Note attached special report.

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C.A.W.

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SECRET 0816

SECRET

350.09 (Misc)
30321

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1) Reinforcement by Soviet Satellite CCF/Manchuria.

It has been stated repeatedly that the potential, in numbered Divisions now in deployment in the border area of Manchuria/Korea is a fait-accompli. The capacity for crossing at Antung or North thereof is not questionable. The decision, however is not within the purview of local intelligence; it will be based on the high-level readiness of the Kremlin to go to war though utilizing the CCF - Manchuria on orders. UNC have taken precautionary measures in conducting daily air recco flights over all avenues of approach from Yalu river. So far no positive movements except intermittent though large-scale truck convoys have been picked up.

2) However, the sighting of 75 aircraft on the Antung field, reported in DIS/2962 should not be ignored. In addition thereto, foreign sources have reported an alleged recent air conference in Peking, presumably dealing with air action. The speculative date of intervention is set for 20th October, probably following some sort of official announcement. Other usually reliable sources in the past few days have indicated increased operational activities, involving probably CCF planes.

3. A check flight today in a general area in the target area, was negative. This by no means precludes that these planes were not actually on the field on initial sightings and have taken off for unknown destination or to dispersal fields.

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0815

350.09 (M130)
30321

SECRET

G-2 Comment:

[illegible] 1950

This speculative estimate involves today's Hongkong Mil Att messages AG 67014, 66948, and 66416. The language of these radios (during the 19th) reaffirm accuracy of the general information. Reference to troop movements, however, are exaggerated. Radios speak of 400,000, in the area, when Manchuria SO does not show more than 250,000 and of that number less than half in deployment, along the Yalu River. While the general opinions discount the actual intervention by the CCF, at this time, as being tactically unsound since the Chinese would run into aggressive UNC Divs, in full deployment and under very strong air cover, this may be wishful thinking. There is plenty of cannon fodder in the Chinese Manchurian armies to be expended as a gesture of Communist solidarity. As the date of Oct 20th is positively stated, we should know within the next 48 Hours.

34467

C.A.W.

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SECRET

350.09 (Misc)
132

SECRET

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SECRET

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M/R: Copies of the above were handcarried
by WO Wilson to the CofS, CofS ROK,
G-3, and JSPOG, at 0100 20 Oct 1950.

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